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I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Jewell lived a relatively quiet life until an explosion in the
Olympic Park at the 1996 Atlanta Games culminated in the press magnifying
rumors, and ultimately trumpeting Jewell as "the prime suspect in the
bombing. His life became a nightmare, to the point where his attire, his
weight, and even his treatment of a pet dog became fodder for gossip
columns and talk shows."' Later cleared of any complicity in the bombing,
Jewell found, to his dismay, that the courts would refuse to entertain his libel
action against the media that had figuratively drawn and quartered him. 2
A young Florida woman, B.J.F., reported her rape to the local police
department. 3 A representative of the department placed the woman's name
in the police blotter.4 A reporter for the local paper, having seen the blotter,
Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University.
A.B., Hamilton College; M.S.L.S., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., Duke
University. The author wishes to thank Professors Billie Jo Kaufman and Fran Tetunic for
their comments on the manuscript, and his research assistants, Olympia Duhart and Diana
Abril, for their attention to the footnotes. The author also wishes to acknowledge the
outstanding work of the reference staff of the Shepard Broad Law Center's Law Library.
1.
ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY 19 (2001).
*

2.
Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). The
appellate decision was handed down after Professor O'Neil had completed his book.
3.
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989).

4.

Id.
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wrote a story on the rape and included the young woman's name.5 Despite
the paper's internal policy (and a state statute) 6 against publishing the names
of rape victims, the paper printed the name. 7 The young woman, suffering
shame and humiliation from the disclosure of her ordeal, found little solace
in the judicial system when the system found the paper had not acted
improperly since it received its information from public record.8
William James Sidis, a child prodigy in mathematics, suffered a
nervous breakdown due to living in the public eye. Several years later, one
of the leading lights in American journalism found him living the life of a
recluse and wrote an article mercilessly exposing the former prodigy's
sheltered and unremarkable lifestyle. 9 Again, the courts offered no relief
when the media had taken a quiet, private person's life and turned it topsyturvy.' 0
All three of these people found themselves sacrificed on the altar of the
First Amendment, watching their emotional life's blood stream down its
sides. All three had no recourse and had to cope with the psychic and
economic consequences of righting their lives, with no assistance from those
who had wronged them. Professor Robert M. O'Neil, Director of the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression, sees little
problem with denying their claims. Adopting the role of High Priest to the
First Amendment, O'Neil dismisses Jewell briefly," relegates B.J.F. to an
endnote, 2 and does not mention Sidis at all. One would hypothesize that
Professor O'Neil regards the lives destroyed by media attention as little more
than the now infamous "collateral damage."' 3
5.
Id.
6.
"No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, or cause or allow to be printed,
published, or broadcast, in any instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other
identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense ...... FLA. STAT. § 794.03
(2000).
7.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 527-28.
8.
Id. at 538.
9.
Later scholars disagree on whether James Thurber actually authored the article, or
simply revised it prior to publication. The name attached to the article was "Jared L. Manley,"
but this might have been a Thurber pseudonym. Whatever the case, Thurber's typewriter
figured significantly in producing the article. See Bent Twig, Time-Life Books, at
http://www.sidis.net/TimeLife.htm (last visited June 18, 2002); Good Will Sidis, HARVARD
MAG., at http://www.harvard-magazine.com/issues/ma98/pump.html (May 1998).
10. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
11. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 19-20.
12. Id. at 177.
13. Senator Bob Kerrey used the term "collateral damage" to describe children who
died at the hands of his American soldiers attacking a village in the Mekong Delta during the
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In his recent slim volume, Professor O'Neil points to what he views as
potential areas in which future civil litigation may chill freedom of the
press.14
Unfortunately, what could have proved an interesting and
significant call to action suffers from maladies that substantially undermine
his argument. He therefore does a significant disservice to those seeking to
protect the media, a group that undeniably has many proponents and
represents a vital position in an ongoing debate of substantial proportions.
Most significantly, O'Neil fails to produce adequate evidence to support his
sweeping thesis that "by the end of the decade [of the 1990s], there were few
places for the news or entertainment media to hide. The First Amendment
could no longer be invoked as a secure shield."' 5 Second, O'Neil distorts the
import and impact of recent cases. Finally, Professor O'Neil commits the
cardinal sin for a law professor of giving inadequate footnote references for
later authors to utilize his discussion.
II.

INCOMPLETE STORIES: MEDIA ETHICS AND UNMENTIONED CASES

In what Professor O'Neil describes as "surely one of the darkest hours
of modem journalism,
Arthur Ashe told a shocked world that he had
contracted AIDS."7 Ashe made the announcement under circumstances not
his own choosing.' 8 Shortly before the announcement, a sportswriter called
Ashe. The sportswriter had discovered Ashe's condition and would publish
it in national media in a matter of days. 19 Ashe, who made every effort to
maintain a private life off the tennis court, had little choice but to make a
public statement himself.2° O'Neil uses the Ashe incident to introduce his
law will jeopardize the
concern that the continuing development of privacy
21
Amendment.
First
the
under
protection
media's
Vietnam War. Timothy McVeigh was executed for destroying the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, causing the deaths of 168 people. "Timothy McVeigh
appropriated the term collateral damage to describe the nineteen children whom he murdered
Lance Morrow, Bob Kerrey and Collateral Damage, at
in Oklahoma City."
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,108054,00.html (Apr. 30, 2001).
14. In his preface, O'Neil speaks of "alarm bells" and "ominous portent[s]" which
have led to "uncertainty and media anxiety." O'NEIL, supra note 1, at x-xi.
15. Id. at xi.
16. Id. at 83.
17. Id. at 78.
18. Id.
19. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 78.
20. Id.
21. Id.at 83.
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[I]t is not too early to ask whether the news media should be concerned about publicizing accurate and newsworthy information
on... [whether a person has contracted AIDS]. Or can they continue to rely comfortably on a First Amendment defense for telling
the truth, which22would presumably provide a solid shield in any
other situation?
One would expect Professor O'Neil to mount a thorough argument
examining whether the established branch of privacy denominated public
disclosure of private facts now threatens to burst the floodgates.23 In this
context, O'Neil argues that an ethical media would not have revealed Ashe's
disease, and we should rely on media ethics for protection.24
Should the sportswriter have intruded on Ashe's personal life and
threatened to expose Ashe's disease? At the early stages, at least, AIDS
would not affect Ashe as a professional tennis player. O'Neil himself
acknowledges that: "A responsible student of the mass media would hope
that the editor or publisher in sole possession of this news would have found
some way not to release it-at least not until Mr. Ashe had time to do so in
his own way. 25 Now, these noble words might express a valiant hope, but
they have little to do with reality. Well before the days of Voltaire,26
humanity realized that it did not live "in this best of all possible worlds."
For one thing, even if we could expect The New York Times to conceal the
story, we would hardly expect that The NationalEnquirerwould follow suit.
But of greater significance, particularly in light of O'Neil's comment
that we would hope the media would exercise some restraint, members of the
media themselves have failed to give any indication that they would respect
privacy. Statements of ethics, whether from national organizations or from
the organs themselves, fail to reveal any significant concern for the privacy
rights of individuals. 27 In short, not only could we expect the Ashe story to
22. Id.
23. The redoubtable William Prosser established four distinct areas of the privacy tort,
among them public disclosure of private facts. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OFTORTS §117, at 809 (4th ed. 1971).
24. See infra text accompanying note 27.
25. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 83.
26.

FRANCOIS MARIE AROUET DE VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE

4 (Easton Press ed., 1977,

Richard Aldington, trans.) (1759).
27. One of the great American papers does protect the privacy of those involved in the
news. The San Francisco Chronicle specifies: "We treat people with respect. This means
having a high regard for personal privacy. Ordinary citizens have a greater right to privacy
than public figures."

SAN

FRANCISCO

CHRONICLE,

ETHICAL NEWS

http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/sanfranciscochronicle.htm
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appear in the Enquirer, we could also fully expect the Times to accord it
significant coverage as well.
The American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE), in its "Statement
of Principles," notes that "U]ournalists should respect the rights of people
involved in the news, observe the common standards of decency and stand
accountable to the public for the fairness and accuracy of their news
reports. ,,28 Yet, such general phrases as "rights of people" and "common
standards of decency" hardly give sufficient guidance to editors and
reporters in deciding whether to run a story or in what manner to attempt to
gather facts. The New York Times has published guidelines which fall far
short of the ASNE statement, commenting only obliquely in a section
dealing with fictionalizing. "If compassion or the unavoidable conditions of
reporting require shielding an identity, the preferred solution is to omit the
name and explain the omission. 29 That small concession, used with the
guarded language of "compassion" and confined to concealing an identity,
can hardly rise to the level of giving subjects of journalistic inquiry any
confidence that their personal lives will not decorate the pages of the Times.
Similarly, The Washington Post offers little solace to the private person.
"As a disseminator of the news, the paper shall observe the decencies that
are obligatory upon a private gentleman.030 Again, and as the Post emphasized following this broad statement, what a private gentleman might do
varies with the time and social mores. 1 The media, both in reporting news
and in commentary, themselves create contemporary standards. 32 Thus, in
1999). Even the Chronicle, however, allows for variations from the general rule when
relative to the "relevance to the story." Id. On the other hand, the Chronicle does
acknowledge that even though it may explore the personal conduct of public figures, private
facts should appear in the paper with relation to "the degree to which private conduct bears on
the discharge of public responsibility." Id.
28. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, Art. VI,
at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?id=888 (last updated Aug. 28, 2002).
at
ON
OUR
INTEGRITY,
GUIDELINES
TIMES,
NEW
YORK
29. THE
http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/newyorktimesintegrity.htm (last updated Dec. 13, 2000).
at
AND
ETHICS,
STANDARDS
POST,
WASHINGTON
30. THE
http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/washingtonpost.htm (last updated Feb. 17, 1999). The Post
also states that it "respects taste and decency, understanding that society's concepts of taste
and decency are constantly changing." Id. However, paragraph I relates to the use of
language in stories reported by the paper, and not to taste and decency in the manner in which
the editors and reporters conduct themselves.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 196 (1890).
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citing common standards and decencies, the Times and the Post theoretically
say little more than they will adhere to whatever norms they can convince
the public to adopt.
A full discussion by Professor O'Neil of the Ashe incident should have
at least called into question the possibility that responsible journalists would
have delayed running the story of Ashe's disease. Regrettably, little exists in
the media's own statements to justify O'Neil's conclusion that we can rely
on the media's ethical standards to protect private matters. Undeniably,
casting the media in a light other than benign hardly furthers O'Neil's
primary argument, for the reader will have less cause to protect media that
ride roughshod over individuals in quest of the almighty scoop. Yet, even a
first-year law student learns that the effective advocate must forthrightly put
forward conflicting arguments and cases, and must distinguish the negative
while asserting the positive.
Leaving aside the question of whether media ethics would cause at least
some editors to eschew reporting that Arthur Ashe had AIDS, there remains
the issue of whether contemporary privacy law threatens media independence. 34 Consider first the evidence put forward by Professor O'Neil. He
points to cases granting equitable relief against paparazzi who hounded
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis and later against others who equally tormented
35
Arnold Schwarzenegger and Maria Shriver. These cases, he argues, pose
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct
proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality ....When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space
available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant
and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.

Id. What Warren and Brandeis wrote over one hundred years ago rings even more loudly
today, when the instruments of mass media reach the entire world and immediacy of reporting
is measured in fractions of seconds rather than in hours or days.
33. See, e.g., HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 279 (4th
ed., 1999).
In the Argument, you develop reasons why your client should prevail in order to
convince the court to accept your conclusions ....In addition, a successful argument
requires you to explain away the points against you ....To ignore the case against
you diminishes your credibility and the strength of your argument.

Id.
34. Suffice it to note that Professor Smolla's article elsewhere in this issue suggests
that the law of privacy not only has developed minimally, but offers little meaningful
opportunity for plaintiffs suing media defendants. Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the
Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289 (2003).
35. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 88 (citing Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir.
1973)). O'Neil offers no citation to the Schwarzenegger case.
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needless civil remedies which unduly restrain the newsgathering process.
"The familiar existing sanctions against harassment, assault, stalking, and
the like should suffice where genuine physical or even emotional harm
results from invasive or trespassory image-gathering .... ,36 But again,
O'Neil fails to tell the full story. The sanctions to which he refers exist in
the sphere of criminal law, where procedural safeguards make successful
prosecution far less likely than the successful pursuit of civil remedies in
courts of equity. 37 Further, we would hardly believe that Professor O'Neil
would champion criminal prosecution of over zealous reporters and
photographers. Thus, relying on existing criminal remedies would prove an
unlikely means of keeping an increasingly intrusive press from exceeding the
bounds of decency.
Professor O'Neil points to another case involving paparazzi, this time
hounding a more private target than the wife of a former president or two
actors.
A married couple, senior executives of a corporation which had39
come under media scrutiny, refused to give interviews to the media.
Reporters and photographers flocked around their home and even followed
them when they went on a vacation, renting a boat and using powerful
40 Calling
microphones to..spy on .the couple.
the
...
,,41 behavior of the media
harassing, hounding, frightening and terrorizing,
the court enjoined any
further intrusive activity. From these extreme facts, Professor O'Neil fears
a flood of cases based on media behavior which might descend as low as
mere petty annoyance. "The critical question, which courts have barely
begun to address, is where and to what extent reasonable expectations of
privacy beyond the home warrant some relief against unwelcome photographic invasions or intrusions. 43
Any number of cases have addressed the issue of intrusion on seclusion,
creating a solid, accepted body of law that establishes parameters for a

36. Id. at 88.
37. The entire nation saw the difference between criminal prosecution and civil tort
actions graphically and painfully displayed in the case of 0. J. Simpson. Acquitted of the
double murders of his ex-wife and her escort, Simpson suffered an economically crushing
defeat in a wrongful death action brought by their estates. What the state failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, the plaintiffs could prove by a preponderance of the evidence.
38. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 75.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 76 (quoting Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
42. Id.
43. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 89.
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Consider, for
comfortable balance between reportage and seclusion."
45
example, Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, where a woman, leaving 4 a6
carnival fun house, stepped on air jets that blew her skirt up over her waist.
An enterprising reporter snapped her photo, which his equally enterprisin
editor ran without her permission in the next edition of the local paper.
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for the woman, stating:
One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed
as an incidental part of that scene in his ordinary status. Where the
status he expects to occupy is changed without his volition to a
status embarrassing to an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity,
then he should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to be proprivacy
tected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right
• of48
merely because misfortune overtakes him in a public place.
The press will incur liability only for excesses that amount to indecency
and vulgarity, as stressed by Daily Times Democrat.49 Similarly, media will
escape liability for public disclosure of private facts when reporting a
newsworthy matter, unless the facts divulged offend the conscience. For
example, the president of the student body of a community college sued a
newspaper that accurately reported that she had undergone a sex change
operation years earlier. 50 At trial, a jury found by special verdict that the
defendants had disclosed a private fact about the plaintiff which "was not
newsworthy; the fact was highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary
sensibilities; defendants disclosed the fact with knowledge that it was highly
offensive or with reckless disregard of whether it was highly offensive; and

44.

See generally RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652B (1976).

45. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
46. Id. at 476.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 478.
49. Id. One should also note that where the media abandons its role in reporting the
news and instead engages in an exclusively profit-making enterprise, it might become liable
under the rubric of publicity. See., e.g., Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967, 968
(D.R.I. 1988). The famous "kissing sailor" photograph which signaled the end of the Second
World War undeniably retains its newsworthy status even today. Id. Yet, when a publisher
sought to sell limited edition copies of the photo at $1600 each, the publisher had to obtain a
written license from the sailor in order to publish, as the protection afforded by newsworthiness no longer applied. Id.
50. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (Ct. App. 1983).
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the disclosure proximately caused injury or damage to [the plaintiff].'.'
Again, liability hinged on the media reporting a fact not only private, but
which the community found offensive to its cultural standards.
As noted earlier, the press itself plays an integral role in shaping
contemporary attitudes and in expanding the standards by which the public
gauges morality.53 When the media creates the standards, it can hardly
complain when it violates its own creation. The law of privacy does little
more than allow the media to create the "breathing space" in which it can
publish truth.54 Who better to gauge the effect of its own articles than the
press?
III. DISTORTED IMPACT
In Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,5 the defendant published a book
56

entitled Hit Man: A Technical Manualfor Independent Contractors. True

to its title, the book provided detailed instructions for any person desiring to
pursue a career as a professional assassin.5 7 It came as no surprise to the
publishers, then, that a reader of the book followed the instructions faithfully
and committed a treble murder for hire. 58 In the aftermath of these brutal
51. Id. (emphasis in original, numbering omitted). Note particularly that Diaz shifted
the burden of proof on the newsworthiness issue from the defendant to the plaintiff. Id. at
769; see also Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998). It is worth noting
that although Professor O'Neil criticizes Shulman for allowing the case to proceed, he
neglects to note that Shulman also put a substantial burden on plaintiffs seeking to sue under
its rubric. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 74-75, 77. And, let us not forget that plaintiffs suing
media defendants for defamatory utterances made in discussion of matters of public concern
must now prove falsity. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986).
Thus, plaintiffs must now prove the traditional elements of their causes of action, but must
also plead and prove the absence of two matters long considered affirmative defensesnewsworthiness and truth. Id.
52. Of the four branches of privacy mentioned in the Restatement, only appropriation
of name or likeness does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate that the invasion of privacy is
"highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B
(intrusion on seclusion), 652D (publicity given to private life), 652E (false light) (1976).
53. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 196.
54. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
55. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
56. At http://faculty-web.at.nwu.edu/commstud/freespeech/cont/cases/hitman.html
(last updated Jan. 1, 2001).
57. Rice, 128 F.3d at 236-41.
58. Id. at 240-41.
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crimes, the personal representative of the decedents' estates sued the
publisher in federal court in a wrongful death action based on state law. 59 At
the summary judgment stage, the publisher argued that the First Amendment
60
to the United States Constitution provided a blanket immunity from suit.
For the purposes of its motion, Paladin Enterprises made some remarkable
concessions: 1) that it marketed the book in such a way as to attract
criminals; 2) that it intended for and indeed knew that the book would be
used by assassins; and 3) that it assisted the assassin in this particular case in
committing the murders. 6 1 Essentially, the defendant conceded that the court
should view its publication of the book in the same light as if Paladin had
written instructions to carry out the specific murders at the direct request of
the assassin.62
The appellate court found little trouble in reversing the district court's
63
granting of the summary judgment motion. In so doing, however, it made
absolutely clear that its decision rested on the nature of the case as presented
to it by the stipulations of fact. 64 "These stipulations are more than sufficient65
to foreclose an absolute First Amendment defense to plaintiffs' suit.
Indeed, the court so limited its decision that it felt obligated to criticize many
66
of the amici curiae for their expansive view of the nature of the case.
That the national media organizations would feel obliged to vigor-

ously defend Paladin's assertion of a constitutional right to intentionally and knowingly assist murderers with technical information
which Paladin admits it intended and knew would be used immediand other crimes against society
ately in the commission of murder
67
breathtaking.
least,
the
say
to
is,
Rice hardly serves as precedent for the traditional "copy cat" claim,
68
none of which had survived the preliminary stages of litigation. Where a
59. Id. at 241.
60. Id.
61. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241-42, n.2.
62. Id. at 241.
63. Id. at 267.
64. Id. at 253.
65. Id.
66. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
67. Id.
68. O'Neil himself grudgingly and secondarily acknowledges "the consistent pattern
of publisher and producer non-liability for imitative or 'copy cat' crimes." O'NEIL, supra note
1, at 179. The acknowledgment, however, only comes in what passes for endnotes.
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murderer saw a movie and acted similarly, 69 or where a child heard a song
and committed suicide,7 ° courts readily rejected later causes of action either
because the nature of the second act meant it constituted a superceding,
intervening cause to the claim of negligence, or because the defendant owed
the particular plaintiff no duty. The trifold nature of the admissions in
Rice-marketing for the purpose of assassination, intent that assassins utilize
the book to commit crimes, and abetting the specific crime that caused the
demise of plaintiffs' decedents--makes the case virtually sui generis.
Soon after Rice, however, a Louisiana appellate court refused to dismiss
a complaint which alleged that the producer of the movie Natural Born
Killers intended for later copy cat crimes to result from the movie. 71 No
other case has since surfaced with a ruling against the defendant at any stage,
nor have further developments arisen in the Louisiana case. Still, Professor
O'Neil elects to grossly misrepresent the impact of Rice. "Thus, within a
matter of months, the legal landscape had changed dramatically. The safe
harbor that publishers, producers, and distributors had taken for granted for
decades had suddenly vanished. 7' 2 O'Neil seems to back away from this
stunning characterization later, when he acknowledges that the intent
element sets both Rice and Byers apart: "Thus, in both cases the defendants
were willing to assume that, even if such an intent could be proved (however
improbable that may have been), no legal liability could have been
imposed., 73 But his retrenchment is indeed short-lived, for on the next page
he again wrings his hands in anguish over the danger he perceives stemming
from these limited cases. "Moreover, once victims' groups and plaintiffs'

69.

70.
1988)).
71.

O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 137-8.

Id. at 153-54 (discussing McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App.
Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1998).

72. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 141. Professor O'Neil does not seem to like very much
about Rice at all. He takes pains to point out that the judge who authored the opinion "was the
son of parents who had been brutally murdered two decades earlier under circumstances so
close to those of the Rice v. Paladin case he had seriously considered recusing himself but in
the end decided he could be objective." Id. at 140. He somewhat gently chides Rodney A.
Smolla for representing the plaintiffs in Rice. "[Smolla's] commitment to take on the
case... seemed a departure from his lifelong defense of expressive and creative interests. Yet
he became convinced that one who profited commercially from distributing material such as
the Hit Man Manual did not merit categorical First Amendment protection." Id. at 155-56.
73. Id.at 157.
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lawyers74 taste media blood, as now they clearly have, life will never be the
same."

Hit Man proceeded to summary judgment on a rarified issue, and then
only at the behest of the defendant. Byers survived dismissal of the
complaint, to be sure, but the plaintiff faces one of the most daunting proofs
in the tort panoply-that the ?5roducer knew or was substantially certain
others would mimic the crime. Indeed, to fit within the parameters of Hit
Man and thus survive summary judgment, the plaintiff would have to prove
the producers marketed Natural Born Killers to the criminal set, knew
assassins would learn their trade from the movie, and perhaps even that they
knew the specific assassin would use the movie to commit the crime. In any
calling, actors find themselves subject to tort suits. Almost 370 years ago,
John Donne wrote: "[L]awyers find out still/Litigious men, which quarrels
move." 76 Things have not changed much, and the possibility of a civil action
74. Id. at 158. Somehow, depicting the media as the Christians and the victims of
their intrusiveness as the lions seems at best surreal.
75.
"Proof of intent necessary for liability in cases such as the instant one will be
remote and even rare .... Byers, 712 So. 2d at 691. See also Rice, 128 F.3d at 265
("[T]here will almost never be evidence proffered from which a jury even could reasonably
conclude that the producer or publisher possessed the actual intent to assist criminal
activity."). The element of acting with knowledge which surfaced in Byers underscores the
United States Supreme Court's solicitousness of the media in another line of cases. Unless the
media actually participates in illegal activity in the newsgathering process, the courts will not
permit either criminal sanctions or civil liability. The Court made this plain in Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), where a radio station broadcast recordings of a cellular phone
conversation. The tapes of the conversation appeared, infant-like, on the station's doorstep
but plainly came from an illegal interception. The radio station "did not participate in the
interception, but they did know-or at least had reason to know--that the interception was
unlawful." Id. at 517-18. The Court refused to sanction either civil or criminal liability based
on title 18, section 2510-11 of the United States Code, making it illegal to intercept or publish
intercepted electronic communications. Without actually participating in the illegal acquiring
of information, the media will not incur liability. This answered the questions remaining after
FloridaStar v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), which protected the newspaper that had published
the name of a rape victim obtained from official records open to the public. It also reaffirmed
those cases holding the media could not trespass on property in the newsgathering process.
See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). The ABC
reporters trespassed in that they gained access to areas of Food Lion stores closed to the
public, and did so by misrepresenting their credentials. Id. at 510. Thus, the apparent consent
of Food Lion to their presence in the meat department was vitiated by the misrepresentation.
Id. But see O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 98. Thus, so long as the media stops short of
participating in illegal activity, it may disseminate any material in its possession which is in
the public interest.
76. JOHN
DONNE,
THE
CANONIZATION
(1633),
available
at
http://eir.library.utoronto.ca/rpo/display/displaypoem.cfm?poemnum=648.
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exists as a cost of doing business. Only when suits progress beyond the
initial stages do they pose a real threat,7 7 and to date none of the small
number of copycat suits has made it beyond summary judgment.
IV. ENDNOTE PROBLEMS
[F]ootnotes have three basic functions: (1) they provide authority
for assertions, and in so doing, provide a bibliography for further
research; (2) they attribute borrowed materials to their sources; and
(3) they continue a discussion begun in the text, but along lines
somewhat
peripheral to the logical development of the primary ar78
gument.

The problem with Professor O'Neil's failure to provide precise footnotes
should in no way suggest improper attribution; instead, Professor O'Neil has
violated the spirit of the first goal of footnotes, and the letter of the third.
While not devoid of bibliographic material, O'Neil's book rather includes a
scant eight pages of source references without pointing the reader to the
specific places in the text (other than a vague chapter-by-chapter listing) to
which the sources refer. The author justifies this sparse treatment by stating:
"Although detailed footnotes seem incompatible with a book of this sort,
familiar though they are to most legal scholars, some references are
appropriate and essential., 79 Readers thus must wonder exactly what "sort"
of book they hold in their hands, and unfortunately the pages of the volume
fail to reveal how, if at all, The FirstAmendment and Civil Liability differs
from any other text or treatise seeking to advance an argument on a point of
8°
law. For example, Marshall Shapo's highly regarded The Duty to Act
argued for a "fiduciary approach to governmental obligation ' 8 1 and appealed

77.

See Byers, 712 So. 2d at 691.

Because this case is before us on a peremptory exception pleading the objection of no
cause of action, we must accept this allegation [of intent] as true .... It is only by
accepting the allegations in Byers' petition as true that we conclude that the film falls
into the incitement to imminent lawless activity exception to the First Amendment.

Id.
78.

ELIZABETH FAJANS & MARY R. FALK, SCHOLARLY WRITING FOR LAW STUDENTS:

SEMINAR PAPERS, LAW REVIEW NOTES, AND LAW REVIEW COMPETITION PAPERS 106 (2d ed.

2000).
79.
80.

(1977).
81.

O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 173.
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT:

TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY

Id. at 154.
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to a wide audience reaching well beyond the legal community, yet contained
thirty-five pages of meticulous notes."
The sketchy notes occasionally fail to identify sources precisely enough
for the reader to track them down without substantial additional work. For
the Jewell case noted above, Professor O'Neil gives us one sentence of
explanation with no specific citation to the actual material on which he relies
beyond a simple declaration that the material exists.83 While readers have
confidence in the accuracy of the statement, they will face a near impossible
task if they wish to pursue the matter further. Plainly, Professor O'Neil had
access to the order he mentions, for he gives us some details on the rationale
of the court. 84 Why not share the bibliographic data with his readers?
Similarly, citations to treatises in general will not serve the needs of readers
looking either for specific guidance or simple overviews. For example, legal
scholars regularly refer to both the Sanford and the Smolla treatises on
defamation," but would hardly hand either work to someone seeking basic
information without more precise direction. Unfortunately, Professor O'Neil
adopts this approach.86 Finally, occasionally the reader will need a precise
citation to pursue the concepts of other scholars. Professor O'Neil identifies
a fascinating quotation from a recent book by Stanley Fish," but gives
readers no ability to find the quote and its related material without massive
effort.88 The book from which O'Neil took the quotation, There's No Such
82. Id. at 155-90.
83.
"The ruling that Atlanta park guard Richard Jewell was a public figure was that
of a Georgia state trial judge; though the decision was appealed, no further proceedings have
been reported." O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 174. Basic rules of citation, let alone fairness,
require something further. O'Neil tells us only that the ruling occurred sometime in late 1999.
Id. at 19. Even if the trial court's ruling went unreported, Rule 10.5(b) of The Bluebook: A
Uniform System of Citation requires an author to "[g]ive the exact date for all unreported
cases and for all cases cited to a looseleaf service, a slip opinion, an electronic database, or a
newspaper." THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.5(b), at 66 (Columbia
Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000).
84. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 19-20.
85.
BRUCE W. SANFORD, SANFORD'S SYNOPSIS OF LIBEL AND PRIVACY (4th ed. 1991);
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION (1986).
86.
"For a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the law of libel and slander,
one might consult [the Sanford or Smolla treatises] ....
O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 174. One
might consult them for an overview, but one would quite likely feel overwhelmed by the
thoroughness of either work.
87.

STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING,

Too (1994).
88. O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 9. At no point in the book does O'Neil indicate a page
for the quotation from Fish.
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Thing As Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too, contains 348 pages in the
paperback edition. 89 That haystack would daunt legal scholars, let alone
laypersons, searching for the quoted needle. Moreover, Professor O'Neil
eschews the opportunity to digress or expand on such tantalizing passages as
the Fish excerpt-a discussion that although relegated to a footnote would
bear great interest for his readers.
In short, while Professor O'Neil makes a stab at including the scholarly
apparatus one expects in a volume of legal thought, whether argumentative
or scholarly, he falls far short of what the profession finds acceptable. He
delineates the sources for his work, true, but fails to give his readers the
ability to move further on specific issues. 90 His explanation for treating
sources in this cavalier manner (it is not that kind of a book) fails to provide
an acceptable reason for deviating as he has done from the minimum
standards of legal practice. 91 While some may regard these objections as
idle carping, Professor O'Neil's refusal to properly annotate his book at the
very least casts a questionable light on his effort to persuade others of the
force of his argument.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor Robert O'Neil has written a seriously flawed book on a
subject that deserves a far more balanced and scholarly treatment. Not since
Anthony Lewis' excellent revisiting of the importance of New York Times v.
Sullivan92 have we seen a full discussion of the vital importance of freedom
of the press in a democratic society.93 Today's world of media, by its sheer
scope if nothing else, demands such a book. From the vanishing local daily
to the vastness of the Internet, we see media the New York Times court could
89.

FISH, supra note 87.

90. Indeed, even the index (although entirely the responsibility of the editor and not
the author) occasionally erroneously refers the reader to pages where the topic is not
discussed. See, e.g., the index entry for Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) which
does not appear on the cited page 179, but which is found on page 177. O'NEIL, supra note 1,
at 177.
91. In the movie Michael, John Travolta plays the Archangel Michael, who when
importuned to perform miracles, responds: "I'm not that kind of angel." MICHAEL (New Line
Cinema 1996). Archangels, he quite correctly suggests, exist to perform battle in the name of
the Lord. Id. When O'Neil baldly asserts he has not written that kind of book, see supra text
accompanying note 79, we are left to wonder what kind of book he in fact has produced.
92. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
93. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW:
AMENDMENT (First Vintage Books ed. 1992) (1991).
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hardly have contemplated, let alone the framers of the First Amendment.
Journalism post-Watergate has adopted an aggressive, almost bullying,
prying methodology, and, aided by technological advances that make it
possible for the media to observe us even through the walls of our own
homes, now has the ability to take upon itself a non-governmental Orwellian
quality. The competition to control a market, whether by print or broadcast
media, leads to a greater quest for a scoop. And all of this takes place in a
society less concerned with appropriate conduct than ever, due in substantial
part to the media's own creation. The media must also acknowledge and
remedy its reluctance to adopt ethical standards of conduct that protect
average citizens from prying.
Yet against all of these considerations, a

democracy can only survive if its members have access to the information
they need to make their decisions. The media must have the "breathing
space" 95 to inform the public. We still need a study that harmonizes our
need for a free press while avoiding the harm media can inflict. 96 What a
pity, then, that Professor O'Neil failed to rise to the challenge. The First
Amendment and Civil Liability promised so much. It delivered so little.

94. O'Neil does throw barbs at the media itself. "To the extent that [news and
entertainment media] seek a more favorable reception in the courts of both law and public
opinion, they might do well to look more often at their own practices and ask whether pressing
free expression to its limits is always helpful." O'NEIL, supra note 1, at 170.
95. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
96. Fifty years ago, a prominent American commented:
I, of course, believe in freedom of the press. It might be well, however, to define
freedom of the press. I understand freedom of the press to mean freedom to print all of
the truth regardless of how pleasant or unpleasant it may be, and regardless of who may
be helped or hurt thereby.
JOE MCCARTHY, MCCARTHYISM: THE FIGHT FOR AMERICA 91 (Joseph Cellini ed., Ayer Co.
1988) (1952). One suspects that Professor O'Neil would agree with the sentiment, although
detest the speaker. These words came from Joseph McCarthy, long reviled as one of the
greatest opponents of freedom of speech in our country's history. That the ultimate Red-baiter
would so vehemently espouse freedom of the press suggests that we must avoid absolutism in
defending the media. McCarthy cared nothing for those he crushed in his fight against
Communism-including a substantial number of members of the media. Using the First
Amendment as an absolute shield when the media harms either the reputation or the
equanimity of persons, whether private or public, perversely recalls the absolutist sword of
McCarthyism.
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